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Abstract
The United Auto Workers (UAW) strike at General Motors in the summer of 1998 had a large impact on
both the microeconomy and the macroeconomy of the United States. GM’s total sales, profits, and market
share all have declined because of the strike. Not only did the strike have an adverse effect on GM’s
financial status, but the nation’s total output, sales, price level, consumer spending, trade deficit, and
employment were all affected. Many satellite businesses depend on GM for sales, service, products, and
supplies. The combination of the losses GM incurred, the losses of satellite businesses, along with other
adverse ripple effects accounts for a significant part of the decline in U.S. GDP growth.
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The Ripple Effect of Union Strikes
A Case Study of the Micro- and Macroeconomic Effects of
the General Motors Strike of 1998
By Korey Harlyn Coon
The United Auto Workers (UAW) strike at
General Motors in the summer of 1998 had a large
impact on both the microeconomy and the
macroeconomy of the United States. GM’s total
sales, profits, and market share all have declined
because of the strike. Not only did the strike have
an adverse effect on GM’s financial status, but the
nation’s total output, sales, price level, consumer
spending, trade deficit, and employment were all
affected. Many satellite businesses depend on GM
for sales, service, products, and supplies. The
combination of the losses GM incurred, the losses
of satellite businesses, along with other adverse
ripple effects accounts for a significant part of the
decline in U.S. GDP growth.
Many different perspectives exist on the
effectiveness of and need for unions. The difficulties
of the UAW at General Motors have raised questions
on the use of unions in modern society and in the
future. In 1998, a bitter battle raged between the
union and the company. The company needed to
increase efficiency to remain competitive in their
market. Therefore, lower-cost outsourcing seemed
inevitable to the company. Outsourcing involves
the selling off of business divisions in order to have
a more focused and profitable company. The very
strong UAW fought for retaining quotas and union
jobs. They were opposed to outsourcing as a means
of cost-efficiency.
The foremost reason underlying the conflict
between GM, who desired a more efficient, lowercost company, is the utilization of major outsourcing
and the UAW’s attempt to force GM to retain
unionized jobs. The company had been unable to
take advantage of new equipment investments
because of work rules put in place by unions. As
GM explained, workers in many sectors work,
“under a quota system that allows them to stop work

once their production targets are met. This means
workers can put in 4.5 to 6.5 hours but get paid for
8 hours of work. As a result, production lines are
running at only slightly more than half of capacity”
(Nauss, 1998). The UAW is scared that GM’s goal
of outsourcing its parts-supply operations is their
way of ridding the company of union workers. GM
asserts that this outsourcing is a necessary and vital
step in order to cut its costs down to the level of its
main competitors (Ford and Chrysler), both of whom
already went through this spin-off process in the
early 1980’s. If GM does not outsource, they will
have a difficult time staying competitive and will
give Ford and Chrysler a comparative advantage.
According to The Washington Post, “GM builds
about 70 percent of its parts in-house, compared with
50 percent at Ford and 30 percent at Chrysler,”
(Brown, 1996). However, the main issue of the
strike does not really involve the striking workers.
The moves GM wants to make would not cause the
present workers to lose their jobs (Smith, 198). The
UAW was not striking for their own jobs but for the
jobs of workers of future generations. This
particular strike illustrates the decline in power of
unions. The disadvantages unions cause in this
increasingly modern, global economy are beginning
to outweigh their advantages.
The direct effects on General Motors
Corporation are not slight in measure. Although
the strike began in June, most of the effects of the
strike were felt in the third quarter of 1998.
Compared to the corresponding months in 1997,
GM’s U.S. sales fell 38% in July and 37% in August
(Peoria Journal Star, 1998). September saw only
a 3.1 percent drop in sales compared to September
1997 (Reuters-Detroit, 1998). The total cost of the
strike to GM in the third quarter was $1.2 billion,
causing a net loss of $809 million compared to a
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mirror manufacturer, and Westcast Industries, an
exhaust system maker (Eldridge, 1998).
By taking all the above-mentioned data into
perspective, it can be seen that the GM strike had a
negative impact on the United States’ GDP, the best
measurement of economic growth. As previously
shown, vital statistics and data involving the impact
the strike made on the GDP, production, buying
power, trade deficit, and employment are evident.
An effect was even felt globally as exports decreased.
GM could very well have the largest influence on
the U.S. economy compared to all other companies.
With over $178 billion in sales per year and the
employment of over 600,000 people, GM has a huge
impact on the economy. Obviously, when a nearly
complete shutdown of business occurs for a
company providing that large of a share of the
nation’s wealth, GDP is significantly effected. The
GM strike halted production in almost all of their
plants. Therefore, a shock to supply occurred in
the U.S. economy. That can be shown as an upward
shift in the SRAS (short-run aggregate supply) curve
in the economic model shown below in Figure 1.
According to this model, leaving all other
factors (such as Federal Reserve monetary policy)
constant, the GM strike would reduce Y (GDP),
and raise the price level in the short-run. Stagflation

net gain of $973 million in 1997. Worldwide market
share for GM in the third quarter fell from 16.6%
last year to 14.2 percent this year (Ellis, 1998). Its
U.S. market share went from pre-strike levels of
31% to a level of about 21% in July and August
1998 (Reuters-Detroit, 1998). Obviously, the
UAW strike that halted vehicle production for
approximately 8 weeks had an enormous impact on
GM.
The strikes also had a large ripple effect in
many various industries that saw sales and profits
drop because of the strikes. For example, the
earnings of steel companies lowered in the third
quarter because the GM strike brought demand for
steel down (Reuters-New York, 1998). Also, H.B.
Fuller, who makes adhesives, sealants, coatings, and
paints saw lower earnings because of the GM strike
(Reuters-St. Paul, 1998). Companies not even in
the manufacturing sector saw effects as well. For
example, TheWashington Post’s earnings were
slowed by the GM strike because of a decline in
advertising revenue on its television stations and in
its Newsweek Magazine (The Washington Post,
1998). In addition, many auto suppliers reported
reduced earnings because of the GM strike. These
include Dana Corp, an engine component supplier,
Excel Industries, a doorframe maker, Gentex, a car

Figure 1: Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply Model
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1998). This effect is shown on Figure 1 as part of
wealth when they are unable to work. Moreover, a
the movement along the AD curve from point A to
strike exacerbates the already sensitive relations
point B after the supply shock shifts the SRAS curve.
between union members and management
Other areas of influence the GM strike had
personnel. Tensions and anxieties lead to tempers
include employment and the trade deficit. Although
and hatred. The large manufacturing town of Flint,
the unemployment rate did not go up during the
Michigan is an example of how a town can become
months of the strike because of the increased demand
divided between blue-collar and white-collar.
for service jobs, there were still over 200,000 GM
Brothers, next-door neighbors, and even husbands
workers who were unemployed for the 2-month
and wives are often on opposite sides of the fences
strike period. This does not include the laid-off
causing additional tensions.
employees from the companies dependent on GM.
As a result of the negative effects discussed
Also as a result of the strike, the U.S. trade deficit
thus far caused by the strike, GM is making and
hit an all-time high of $16.8
planning to make many
billion in August due
changes within its company.
partially to increased imports
Their first priority is to regain
People lose their
of automobiles and decreased
their market share and
ambition, morals and
auto exports caused by the
financial strengths. To retrieve
strike (Goozner, 1998). The
their market share, they are
wealth when they are
depreciation of the Japanese
offering more discounts and
unable
to
work.
yen also caused car imports
rebates to attract customers
to go up because as the yen
back to their products. Besides
Moreover, a strike
decreased in value relative to
the short-term goal of returning
exacerbates
the
already
the U.S. dollar Japanese
its U.S. market share to a preproducts became cheaper
strike level of 31%, GM has
sensitive relations
compared to U.S. products.
many other plans in order to
between
union
members
The scope of the GM
ensure
the
long-run
strike goes beyond the
profitability
of
the
company.
and management
financial and economic
Presently, GM has too many
personnel.
effect. A huge social impact
product lines, supplies too
was felt as well. As the over
many of its own parts, has an
200,000 strikers went from
overabundance of workers, has
$1,000 a week with overtime to a meager $200 to
untapped productivity capabilities and has bad union
$300 a week in unemployment, hardships resulted.
relations. They are currently taking measures to
It is easy for workers to become bored and depressed.
decrease the total variety of automobiles offered
The downtown cafes and stores where workers used
while still bringing new innovative models into the
to congregate during lunch break and after work
market. GM simply must weed out the least
quickly became barren as money became scarce.
profitable models at a faster rate than it is adding
Changes in family relationships also resulted from
new models.
the strike. Tensions over finances become an issue
The second problem, having too many of
during strikes and can lead to friction between
their suppliers within the company, is a sticky issue.
spouses. On the other hand, the extra time a striking
Outsourcing was part of the reason for the UAW’s
family person has could allow them more time with
strike. Yet, to stay competitive and survive in the
their children and/or spouse that they would not
modern, global economy, they have to cut costs by
normally have. During most strike periods, birth
outsourcing. As was mentioned earlier, their
rates go up nine months after a strike has begun.
competitors Ford and Chrysler did much of their
Without a doubt, crime also increases during a strike
outsourcing in the early 1980’s. Because GM is
period. People lose their ambition, morals, and
trying to currently do this outsourcing the union
36
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difficulties are unique to their company. Obviously,
because of unions, outsourcing will have to be a
slow process. However, GM has already begun to
sell off some of its parts suppliers. Soon after the
end of the strike on August 3, 1998, GM announced
its plans to sell off its Delphi Automotive Systems
parts division. Not only will it relieve GM of some
of its most inefficient business, it will also remove
over 200,000 workers from its payroll (53,000 of
which are UAW). In addition, GM is consolidating
five marketing divisions into one in order cut payroll
costs by eliminating 1000 jobs (Bartash, 1998). GM
has also announced the layoff of several thousand
employees of its German subsidiary Adam Opel AG
in the heavily unionized Europe (WSWS, 1998).
In an effort to increase productivity, GM is
re-configuring their manufacturing process by
making it faster and more flexible. They recently
announced a $1.5 billion engineering upgrade going
toward the consolidation and modernization of its
operations. As far as union relations are concerned,
it will take careful management to achieve its goal
of cutting costs while appeasing the UAW. Gradual
outsourcing and the elimination of jobs through
retirement as opposed to lay-offs would be the best
way.
All of this in mind, one might ask where the
role of unions in the U.S. economy is headed.
Certainly, the influence of unions is decreasing.
Nonetheless there will always be a place for unions,
even if their influence is reduced from their past
place of power. Mark Wilson, a Labor Economist
for the Heritage Foundation said, “There will always
be a need for unions because there will always be
evil employers,” (Wilson, 1998). In 1991, 16% of
U.S. employment was unionized. Wilson claims
the percentage has declined to 9.5% now and expects
it to soon be at 5%. In a more specific example, the
UAW has lost over half its members since 1979
(Nauss, 1998). What are the reasons for this? First,
in the highly competitive global market, companies
search for non-union labor in order to cut
employment costs. In addition to companies going
elsewhere for labor, some union members are forced
to disband because they are simply too expensive
for their employers. James Martin, Senior VP of
Human Resources at TWA, explains that in order

to be an employee you have to have an employer
(Martin, 1998). He is saying that union members
have to realize that companies have to make money
in order to pay out wages.
Another reason for the decline in union
membership is the sectoral shift of jobs from the
manufacturing industries to the service industries.
Also, the need for unions has dropped drastically
since their formation because of the many laws,
regulations, and government actions in place
preventing an unsafe or unfair workplace. The need
for unions to make the workplace fair and safe has
decreased since the government has had a more
active role concerning this. This role unions played
was one of their main purposes for formation and
existence. The last reason for the slippage in U.S.
union membership is their lack of success in some
recent strikes or negotiations. For example, the
UAW dispute at Caterpillar that lasted over six years
was a complete loss for the UAW. Granted, although
Caterpillar is smaller in size than GM (only 12,000
union members) and does not have as significant of
an economic impact, it still stands as an example
for companies experiencing strikes in the future.
Caterpillar hired temporary and replacement
workers that resulted in the company making record
profits quarter after quarter while the strike took
place. The UAW did not have much of a leg to
stand on in their negotiations. These kinds of results
show how some companies can ward off union
resistance, thus weakening the entire union system
in the U.S. In the increasingly competitive global
economy, high paying union jobs are rapidly
declining in the United States’ workforce.
To conclude, the recent strike at GM
confirmed that it is a large enough company to have
a significant impact on the U.S. economy, society,
and unions. Even though the strike left little solved,
it brought out information that people might have
been overlooking. GM realized that its new
strategies for growth and realignment would not be
easy to initiate. People were also shown that the
U.S. economy is not invincible because of the
fragility of GDP growth. Also, many more began
to question the advantages of unions in an everchanging, cost-cutting, global economy.
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